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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KEVIN MONDEL MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 48596-2021
Caribou County Case No.
CR15-19-227

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Martinez failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence?
ARGUMENT
Martinez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His
I.C.R. 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
Martinez robbed a bank in Soda Springs, Idaho. (PSI, p. 8.) He then admitted robbing

two other banks, one in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, and the other in Salt Lake City, Utah. (PSI, p.
11.) The state charged him with one count of robbery. (R., pp. 51-52.) He accepted a plea
agreement pursuant to which he would plead guilty, while the state agreed that it would not
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forward the matter to federal prosecutors and that his sentence “can run concurrently with similar
charges in Teton County Wyoming and Salt Lake County Utah.” (R., pp. 61-63.)

The court

accepted Martinez’ guilty plea (R., pp. 77-78), and then imposed a sentence of ten years with
five years fixed (R., pp. 100-02; Tr., p. 35, L. 19 – p. 36, L. 3). Martinez filed a motion under
I.C.R. 35 requesting leniency.

(R., pp. 103-04.)

In support, he submitted a judgment of

conviction entered in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming on a conviction for
bank robbery, sentencing Martinez to thirty months of imprisonment to be served concurrently
with Martinez’ sentence in this case. (R., pp. 116-25.) He also submitted a letter from his
mother. (R., p. 126.) Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp. 132-33.)
Martinez timely appealed. (R., pp. 134-36.)
B.

Standard Of Review
“If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule

35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In evaluating whether a lower
court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether
the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
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C.

Martinez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
“In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive

in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of
the motion.” State v. Yang, 167 Idaho 944, 949, 477 P.3d 998, 1003 (Ct. App. 2020) (citing
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)). “An appeal from the denial of
a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. Idaho appellate
courts reviewing “the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion … consider the entire record and apply
the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” State v.
Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903, 341 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Ct. App. 2014).
Because Martinez’ sentence is within statutory limits, to show that it is nevertheless an
abuse of discretion he must show that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007); I.C. § 18-6503
(providing that robbery is punishable by not less than five years imprisonment and up to life). In
determining whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but,
because the decision to release the defendant on parole is exclusively the province of the
executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017). To establish
that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A
sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”
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Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8,
368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view
of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. Furthermore, a sentence fixed
within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion
by the trial court.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (internal citations, quotation
marks, and alterations omitted).
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Martinez submitted two documents: a judgment of
conviction for bank robbery in federal district court (R., pp. 116-25) and a letter from his mother
(R., p. 126).
The letter from Martinez’ mother discusses his background, her support of Martinez, his
struggles with substance abuse and mental health issues, and her hope that he will receive
treatment. (R., p. 126.) All of that information was included in the presentence report and none
constitutes the new evidence required to support a Rule 35 motion. (PSI, pp. 11 – 21.) The
district court recognized as much in considering and denying the motion. (Tr., p. 54, L. 7 – p.
55, L. 8. See also Tr., p. 28, Ls. 7 – p. 35, L. 18 (district court at sentencing extensively
discussing Martinez’ substance abuse and mental health issues, background, and family
support).) At any rate, even if it were new information, nothing in the letter would show that his
sentence constituted an abuse of discretion.
Instead, as he does on appeal, below Martinez relied primarily on the sentence imposed
by the federal district court, arguing that his sentencing in this case should be modified to
“mirror” the sentence imposed by the federal district court. (Tr., p. 43, L. 5 – p. 46, L. 14;
Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.) But on appeal, as below, Martinez does not explain why his sentence
for a different crime imposed by a court in another jurisdiction would suggest that his sentence

4

for this crime imposed by an Idaho court is excessive. As an initial matter, there is no evidence
at all regarding the factual circumstances of the bank robbery for which Martinez was sentenced
in federal court, the evidence considered by the court at sentencing, or how the federal court
reached its determination. As the district court here noted, “We, quite frankly, have no idea what
happened in federal court.” (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 1-7.) But, as the district court also noted, even on the
assumption that the crimes were relevantly similar and the federal court considered similar
evidence at sentencing, Idaho’s sentencing system provides courts far more flexibility to
sentence in accordance with the court’s view of the facts and circumstances than does the federal
system. (Tr., p. 50, L. 9 – p. 53, L. 15.) The fact that a different sentence was imposed for a
different crime by a different court operating under a different sentencing system not only does
not show that the district court here imposed an excessive sentence, it is entirely irrelevant to the
question whether the court did so.
Martinez failed to submit new evidence in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion showing his
sentence was an abuse of discretion. This Court should therefore affirm the denial of that
motion. But even looking to the court’s initial sentencing discussion, it is clear that the court did
not abuse its discretion. The district court’s sentencing analysis was extensive and detailed,
showing that the court recognized its discretion; acted within the outer boundaries of that
discretion; applied the appropriate legal standards, including the goals of sentencing; and reached
its sentencing determination by an exercise of reason in light of the mitigating and aggravating
factors. (Tr., p. 24, L. 24 – p. 36, L. 3.) The court focused in particular on the impact on the
victims in this case (Tr., p. 26, L. 13 – p. 28, L. 2); the fact that this was not an isolated crime,
but, Martinez admitted bank robberies in multiple states (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 2-6; p. 31, L. 12 – 32, L.
1); his extensive criminal history (Tr., p. 30, L. 13 – p. 31, L. 4); his “extremely high” LSI-R
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score (Tr., p. 34, Ls. 2-12); and his repeated failures at rehabilitation through prior substance
abuse and mental health treatment (Tr., p. 29, L. 25 – p. 30, L. 12; p. 31, Ls. 5-11; p. 33, Ls. 419; p. 34, L. 13 – p. 35, L. 18).
The district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in initially imposing the sentence,
and nothing submitted by Martinez in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion shows that the sentence is
excessive.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying
Martinez’s I.C.R. 35 motion.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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